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IMMANUEL KANT’S ATONEMENT “WITHIN THE BOUNDS
OF BARE REASON” AND THE VIABILITY OF MORAL
RECEPTIVITY AS A CONDITION OF GRACE
Derek S. Nutt
Berrien Springs, Michigan

Immanuel Kant attempted to articulate an account of religion that provides
genuine hope through its rational certitude and universal applicability. Kant’s
analytical foray into the mysteries of the atonement was not a biblical or
systematic theological project. Through the practical reason primordially
present to humankind, he sought a “pure religion” where individual belief in
personal salvation is warranted.1 Whereas Kant is attempting to build a system
acceptable within a purely rational worldview, and thereby uses philosophical
presuppositions that disallow historical, religious propositions, he does not
deny the possibility of what Christian tradition asserts was accomplished in
first-century Palestine.2
Preliminarily, I intend to establish that a concatenation of Kant’s
epistemology, moral philosophy, and view of providence brings him to a
subjective atonement. Then, I explore two foci that challenge the consistency
of Kant’s subjective account of atonement. The first problem embraces the
removal of debt both before and after conversion. The second problem is
that Kant’s purely rational system is unable to adequately articulate the
possibility and identity of grace in relation to the moral agent. Kant’s attempt
involves a remarkably innovative proposal of a dynamic interplay of God and
humankind in justification, which could be meaningful within a covenantal
framework for understanding salvation. However, the weakness of Kant’s
covenantal perspective results in a moral interpretation of the atonement that
is contradictory, ambiguous, and paradoxical. For his purposes of providing
warrant for a personal belief in salvation, Kant’s unresolved problems with
explaining atonement bring his interpreters back full circle through the use of
“bare reason” to an inexorable distance between God and sinful humankind.

Nicholas P. Wolterstorff, “Conundrums in Kant’s Rational Religion,” in Kant’s
Philosophy of Religion Reconsidered, ed. Philip J. Rossi & Michael Wreen (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1991).
2
Immanuel Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, ed. and trans. Allen W. Wood
and George di Giovanni, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 445–446 (AA 28:1120–1121). The
following abbreviations are used hereafter in the footnotes of this article to refer to
Kant’s texts: “AA” refers to the Prussian Academy edition (Preussische AkademieAusgabe) of Kant’s Works and this precedes the volume and page number(s). “A”
and “B” refer to the first and second editions, respectively, of Kant’s Kritik der reinen
Vernunft (Critique of Pure Reason) and are followed by the page number(s).
1
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Epistemology as Precursor to View of Atonement
Kant’s theory of knowledge begins with the premise that the human mind
is innately structured to project reality. The laws of nature, incumbent on
the “world” of phenomena, act by physical necessity, and causal relations
can be known in time so that certain knowledge of nature is possible. The
individual receives information through the senses, and their mind organizes
the material data according to its a priori intuitions of time and space. Further
a priori categories of the understanding rearrange the data into various modes
of relationship. As long as a concept of the understanding is originally derived
from sense experience, it is able to be held as scientific knowledge. That is, it
may be accepted as objective knowledge, versus opinion or belief.3
But there is also an “intelligible world” that is not subject to the strictures
of space and time and cannot be understood, scientifically speaking. Items in
this transcendent realm are not accessible by reason’s theoretical use. They
have no referent in sensible experience, and thus, transcendental ideas such as
God, the soul, and the workings of divine grace are unknowable by reason’s
theoretical use, even partially or analogically.4
Leaving the transcendent and returning to the historical/spatiotemporal,
Kant allows that empirical facts may be gathered about historical events, but
their essential identity remains elusive. This means that historical facts can
provide no objective knowledge on which to ground religious belief.5 This
is because the essence (Ding an sich; noumenon) of any historical thing (e.g.,
Jesus of Nazareth, the cross) is timeless. But the object as one can know it, the
phenomenon, is temporal and subject to change. This gives it a lesser degree of
reality, not absolute reality.6
Besides people and events, special revelation also occurs in history and
is particularly found in nature. This means that it is not accessible to all
but is subject to personal interpretation—for who can be assured that their
interpretation is the correct one? Therefore, all human beings cannot be
responsible or be required to find a rationally certain basis for hope from the
content of special revelation. Furthermore, it provides no rational, scientific
knowledge of metaphysical truths. If humankind can have no rational
knowledge of ultimate reality, then it follows logically that the intelligible
world (and an ultimate being) must not be able to present at least a partial
picture of ultimate reality, say perhaps, with the assistance of grace, to all finite
beings. There is, for Kant, a gulf between the knowledge of the transcendental
and phenomenal “world” that cannot be bridged by theoretical reason’s grasp
of a special revelation. To recklessly attempt to do so is superstition.7
3
Idem, The Critique of Pure Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1998), 500 (A, 471; AA 3:327); idem, Religion and Rational Theology. 13–14
(AA 8:141).
4
Idem, The Critique of Pure Reason, 409 (B, 396; AA 3:261).
5
Idem, Religion and Rational Theology, 142 (AA 6:109–110).
6
Idem, The Critique of Pure Reason, 181 (B, 52; AA 3:61).
7
Idem, Religion and Rational Theology, 280–285 (AA 7:65).

Immanuel Kant’s Atonement “Within the Bounds of Bare Reason” 317

Kant’s treatment of providence parallels the existence of this gulf between
noumena and the phenomena of history. Providence does not include, as
Christian tradition has typically presented it, a divine being’s personal
interventions, or miraculous and particular acts of preservation in history. For
Kant, the laws of nature were established by one act of God in eternity and
work only according to their necessary functioning in time.8 It is actually they
who are directly guiding the course of history and the destiny of the human
species. Kant calls this predetermined providence “that great artist, nature.”9
The notion of special revelation, in which God arbitrarily breaks through
and enlightens some particular people or prophet, is unfathomable; the
miraculous incarnation of an eternal being in time would also conflict with
the laws of nature. Moreover, even if either of these happened, the group or
individual would have no way of knowing for certain that it was God talking
to them or walking among them.10
The historical event of atonement, the crucifixion of Jesus of Nazareth,
is understood by humankind through such a historical revelation. Only a
portion of humanity is exposed to this content, however. This is not sufficient
for Kant’s intentions of a pure religion, since that religion must be universally
accessible to be valid. The historical, atoning death of Jesus has been received
through “outer” revelation and does not provide certain, verifiable content
for a pure religion constituted by reason. The essence (noumenon) of the
historical crucifixion, its true meaning, is also completely unintelligible to
theoretical reason. Furthermore, it is not accessible to all. Therefore, there
must be another form of revelation, a greater “inner” revelation by way of
reason, that can make the historical event (e.g., the cross) rationally useful.
This would allow all of humankind to have genuine hope in salvation.11
Where speculative reason fails for Kant, he retains entrance to the
transcendental realm by proposing that the quest for justified belief is realized
only by means of the use of practical reason. Each person has an a priori
consciousness of the moral law. As a free moral agent, they are also aware of
themselves as both an intelligible and phenomenal individual.12 In the world
8
Kant considers providence as the equivalent of the laws of nature, which God
has already “wound” as a clock: “and for this reason nature, regarded as a necessitation
by a cause the laws of whose operation are unknown to us, is called ‘fate,’ but if we
consider its purposiveness in the course of the world as the profound wisdom of a
higher cause directed to the objective final end of the human race and predetermining
the course of the world, it is providence” (ibid., 331 [AA 8:360–362]); Kant writes
also, “Providence is in God one single act” (ibid., 437 [AA 28:1110]).
9
Idem, “Zum ewigen Frieden,” Prussian Academy of Sciences, n.d., https://
korpora.zim.uni-duisburg-essen.de/Kant/aa08/360.html (AA 8:360).
10
Idem, Religion and Rational Theology, 444 (AA 28:1118).
11
Ibid., 443 (AA 28:1117). See also 140–152 (AA 6:108–120).
12
Idem, Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 98,
218 (AA 4:451; AA 5:97–98). In Allen W. Wood, Kant’s Moral Religion (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1970), 6, Wood states this dichotomy by saying that for
Kant “human nature is dialectical.”
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of appearances, they are subject to physical necessity and particular conditions,
but in the intelligible world they are absolutely free and wholly responsible
for their conduct. They are able to deduce a categorical imperative to obey
the moral law and, from that, the transcendental ideas of God, immortality,
and freedom; and with these, practical reason demands that the attainment
of the highest good (summum bonum)—moral perfection and a proportional
conferral of eternal happiness—must be possible.13
Atonement Apart from Revelation
Filtered through his epistemic limitations and emboldened by his robust moral
philosophy (adumbrated above),14 Kant’s version of religion is an account of
the existential perspective of the moral agent as they endeavor to find certainty
in the hope that they can attain eternal blessedness (summum bonum).15 Here
we arrive at an analysis of Religion Within the Boundaries of Bare Reason, a
remarkable attempt by the Enlightenment philosopher to establish epistemic
justification for personal salvation.16
An initial problem that Kant’s account of atonement faces is the question
of the removal of debt before conversion.17 Since, according to the categorical
imperative of moral duty, one “ought” to be holy according to the moral law,
it follows that one “can.” Kant expresses it in this way: “The human being
must make or have made himself into whatever he is or should become in
a moral sense, good or evil. These two [characters] must be an effect of his
free power of choice, for otherwise they could not be imputed to him, and
consequently, he could be neither morally good nor evil.”18
The “ought implies can” principle places the highest duty upon the
individual and demands by itself that their achievement of the highest good
occurs without external assistance. External propitiation for the debt caused
by infinite, radical evil, the “most personal of all liabilities,” is not only
unethical, but it would destroy freedom, a founding element of the moral
Kant, Practical Philosophy, 238–240, 246–247 (AA 5:122–124, 132).
The interpretation of Kant’s philosophy is obviously far from comprehensive,
but this is a brief outline intended merely to show on what basis Kant must move to
a subjective atonement.
15
I do not intend here that Kant reduced religion as a whole to morality. He did
not disregard ecclesiastical religion and faith entirely, as mentioned earlier, only that as
part of his philosophical project, moral reason is the only means of gaining certifiable
evidence to justify religious belief (see Wolterstorff, “Conundrums,” 41).
16
Ibid.
17
I use the term “before conversion” for purposes of understanding Kant’s
thought in the context of soteriological discourse; as will be shown, the noumenal self,
which must enact its conversion outside of time with absolute spontaneity, cannot
technically be construed in terms of “before” and “after.” Thus, throughout this paper,
references to a before and after conversion are not used technically, although they are
accurate from the perspective of Kant’s phenomenal self.
18
Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, 89 (AA 6:44).
13

14
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self.19 Obviously, this is problematic from the perspective of traditional
Christian soteriology, especially if this is all Kant has to offer.20 One would
think that Kant is left with only the prospect of personal remission. But to the
contrary, the individual is also equally incapable of paying their own debt.21
Further exacerbating the difficulty of debt is Kant’s insistence on the
absolute spontaneity of the human will in his concept of freedom.22 The
spontaneous freedom of the will, grounded only in the law, is by definition
autonomous; this distances the radically evil, supersensible self from any
external assistance, since autonomy makes it impossible for any external entity
to condition or determine volition, be it divine, human, sensible experience,
or otherwise.23
With the above factors in mind, Kant attempts to solve the problem
of debt before conversion in a most creative way. He posits in the moral
consciousness of the individual an archetype through which each may
recognize, and acquire force to achieve, the ideal of moral perfection. One’s
duty is to adopt (“elevate themselves to”) the disposition of this prototype
into their own maxim so that they possess, as close as possible, the disposition
of the prototype. At this time, satisfaction for sin is also made and conversion
from the evil to the good disposition occurs, as Kant writes:
[T]he punishment must be thought of as executed in the situation of
the conversion itself . . . conversion is an exit from evil and an entry into
goodness, “a putting off of the old man and the putting on of the new.” .
. . The emergence from the corrupted disposition into the good is in itself
already sacrifice and entrance into a long train of life’s ills which the new
human undertakes in the disposition of the Son of God.”24

This solution Kant presents of the “new man” suffering and satisfying
the punishment (paying the debt) due the “old man” is not analytically
Ibid., 113 (AA 6:72).
John Silber, “The Ethical Significance of Kant’s Religion,” in Religion within
the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New
York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), cxxxii. Silber is correct when he writes that Kant’s
view of freedom is logically incompatible with grace even though Kant insisted on the
possibility of grace: “When Kant confronted the Antinomies, he presented thesis and
antithesis and then offered a resolution. His absolute conception of freedom precludes
the need for grace, since every guilty man freely wills to become guilty; the purity
of the moral precludes grace; for grace violates the uncompromising nature of the
law” (ibid.).
21
Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, 112 (AA 6:72).
22
Idem, Practical Philosophy, 94; idem, Religion and Rational Theology, 72–73
(AA 4:46; AA 6:23–24). Kant writes that “freedom of the power of choice has the
characteristic, entirely peculiar to it, that it cannot be determined to action through
any incentive except so far as the human being has incorporated it into his maxim. . . .
[O]nly in this way can an incentive, whatever it may be, coexist with the absolute
spontaneity of the power of choice (freedom)” (emphasis original).
23
Idem, Practical Philosophy, 166, 199, 89 (AA 5:33, 76; AA 4:40).
24
Idem, Religion and Rational Theology, 104, 113–114 (AA 6:61–62, 73–74).
19
20
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reconcilable25 with the deeper structure of Kant’s autonomous and timeless
self. That there can be a new self (who makes the decision for good) emerging
from the old (who has made the decision for bad) is the question. Kant
surmises that the old and new are morally different persons that represent a
legitimate transformation of the human being.26 This change logically brings
the inevitability of antecedent conditions to the self-determining apparatus
of the self that is, the free will. This means that contingent states and actions
in time (e.g., knowledge of right and wrong, fear, pangs of guilt, conviction,
repentance) may have no effect on the supersensible self, as this would destroy
its spontaneity. Kant is conjecturing a qualitative change of the supersensible
self, where some pillars of his moral system do now allow. The character
of the individual “must be a result of the timelessness of the choice of the
supreme maxim,” but in the change from evil to good, the only other logical
way of conceiving this event—apart from divine aid or events in time—is that
the noumenal “old man” must be, in some way, a prior determinant of the
creation of the new.27
Kant’s conversion account also contradicts the deep structure of his view
of the transformation of the self in regards to the problem of radical evil. The
radical evil that characterizes the moral disposition of the old self “corrupts the
ground of all maxims” for action in time.28 He claims that the human being
brings about their good or evil disposition according to whether they absorb
into their rule of conduct (maxim) the habitual desires of the original good
predisposition that humanity was created with. But Kant does not explain
how or why the evil self would make the movement for this change.29 The
evil self is irrevocably set in its moral direction and there is nothing good that
can overpower and reverse this disposition so that it is capable of choosing the
good. Furthermore, it cannot be determined by the good disposition which
does not yet “exist.” As Jacqueline Mariña observes, something mediate is
missing that would allow an unadulterated (by evil), unconditioned choice to
take place.30 A third self, neither good nor evil, must be abstracted by Kant;
yet this is also impossible because as Kant says the “disposition as regards the
moral law is never indifferent.”31 Radical evil has corrupted the ground of all
maxims, and it is inconceivable that a morally neutral self, lurking about in
Kant must know that his explanation is insufficient when he says that the
“reascent” from evil back to good is “no more comprehensible” than the fall from
good to evil (ibid., 90 [AA 6:46]).
26
Ibid., 114 (AA 6:74); see also Leslie A. Mulholland, “Freedom and Providence
in Kant’s Account of Religion: The Problem of Expiation,” in Kant’s Philosophy of
Religion Reconsidered, ed. Philip J. Rossi & Michael Wreen (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1991), 87.
27
Ibid., 88.
28
Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, 83 (AA 6:37).
29
Ibid., 89 (AA 6:44).
30
Jacqueline Mariña, “Kant on Grace: A Reply to His Critics,” RelS 33.4 (1997): 87.
31
Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, 73 (AA 6:24).
25
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human nature with no duty to the law and without being externally placed
there, exists. The idea of a self qua self without the moral law is inconceivable
for Kant—even the opposing selves, good and evil, that Kant imagines in
Religion are only considered as such because of their moral status. These puzzles
and contradictions, as abstruse as they may seem, are incredibly important for
Kant’s ability to explain the removal of debt, because it is in the conversion of
the old to the new self where the suffering requisite for satisfaction takes place.32
It is important to remember, at the risk of falling into indicting Kant
with Pelagianism, that he admits the human inability to become good on
their own, and he sees the logical contradiction of this and the freedom to
do just the same without divine aid. This is, in Kant’s view, an antinomy
that is not reconcilable through theoretical reason’s imagining external aid.
Theoretical reason might posit a “divine merit not its own . . . preceding every
good work,”33 but human knowledge may not attain to knowledge of this to
ground belief. Kant’s bottom line is that practical reason can find no benefit
for morality in allowing divine aid to be a factor in conversion.34
What Kant removes (divine aid) from conversion, he allows into his
discussion of the moral self who has chosen the good disposition. There is
little doubt, in spite of his own vacillations, that Kant thought divine aid,
practically considered, was possible for the converted earnestly pursuing the
summum bonum:
[R]eason does not leave us altogether without comfort with respect to the
lack of righteousness of our own (which is valid before God). Reason says
that whoever does, in a disposition of true devotion to duty, as much lies
within his power to satisfy his obligation (at least in a steady approximation
toward complete conformity to the law), can legitimately hope that what
lies outside his power will be supplemented by the supreme wisdom in some
way or other (which can render permanent the disposition to this steady
approximation).35

Ibid., 113–114.
Ibid., 148 (AA 6:117–118).
34
For example, Kant writes in his general remark on grace in conversion that
“Granted that supernatural cooperation is also needed to his becoming good or better,
whether this cooperation only consist in the diminution of obstacles or be also a positive
assistance, the human being must nonetheless make himself antecedently worthy of
receiving it.” Here Kant appears to allow grace into the event of conversion, but he
qualifies this entire section by noting that what he has said is a “parerga to religion
within the bounds of reason” that is to say, grace in conversion is not consistent with
the use of practical reason (ibid., 89, 96 [AA 6:44, 52]).
35
Ibid., 191 (AA 6:171). In “The Conflict of the Faculties,” Kant’s notion of grace
after conversion is even more robust in that it is thought practically beneficial: “faith
in this supplement for . . . deficiency is sanctifying, for only by it can man cease to
doubt that he can reach his final aim (to become pleasing to God) and so lay hold of
the courage and firmness of attitude he needs to lead a life pleasing to God.” (idem,
“The Conflict of the Faculties,” in Religion and Rational Theology, 268 [AA 7:44]).
32
33
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From this passage, found not in a parerga36 and clearly referring to the
self subsequent to conversion, one can see the inklings of an interplay between
human initiative and divine aid, and further, that the individual has epistemic
justification (“legitimate hope”) for believing in this aid. Interestingly, when
Kant says “our lack of righteousness,” he is implying that what the individual
may legitimately hope for is an alien righteousness. The context of this passage
is that Kant is concerned that the self, despite its choice of the highest maxim
and the good disposition, must still fall short of the summum bonum. The
noumenal self upon conversion is no longer, by virtue of its good disposition,
considered evil,37 but actions in time by the sensible self, which flow from the
good disposition, are deficient. As Kant explains,
Even the purest moral disposition elicits in the human being, regarded
as a worldly creature no more than the continuous becoming of a subject
well pleasing to God in actions (such as can be met with in the world of
senses). In quality (since it must be thought as supersensibly grounded) this
disposition can indeed be, and ought to be, holy and conformable to the
archetype’s disposition. In degree, however, (in terms of its manifestations
in actions) it always remains deficient and infinitely removed from that of
the archetype.38

The deficiency, still evident in the sensible experience of the individual,
will still disqualify the human being from the summum bonum, even though
they have chosen the good disposition. By distinguishing between “quality,”
a reference to the supersensible self’s good disposition, and “degree,” which is
a term denoting movement of the sensible self in its ongoing quest for moral
perfection, Kant means to emphasize that the latter is a continual work-inprogress, while the former is already “there.” The impediment to salvation
for the human being still remains. The “infinite” deficiency must disqualify
the human being from the summum bonum, even though they have chosen
the good disposition, because the deeds do not always measure up to the
disposition. Kant’s solution is to make the good disposition stand in the place
of the deficiencies in God’s judgment. The good disposition is the supersensible
ground of the actions in time, and God, who alone can apprehend the
inscrutable noumenal self, sees the timeless unity of the individual’s endless
moral progress and judges them, at whatever point in their life after choosing
the good disposition, based solely on their disposition, not on their temporal
and permanent deficiencies.39
36
I mention this because, as Barth notes, some of the positive affirmations Kant
makes about grace are found within his “General Remarks,” and these, he states, do not
fit within the confines of moral reason (Karl Barth, Protestant Thought: From Rousseau
to Ritschl, trans. Brian Cozens [New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959], 187–188).
37
Kant states “Nor can a human being be morally good in some parts, and at the
same time evil in others. For if he is good in one part, he has incorporated the moral
law into his maxim” (Religion and Rational Theology, 73).
38
Ibid., 115n (AA 6:74–75).
39
Kant writes, “How can this disposition count for the deed itself, when this deed
is every time (not generally, but at each instant) defective? The solution rests on the
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This discussion of supplemental (imputed) grace leads to a question,
given that divine aid may be supposed to reside within the moral agent or
external to it, about the nature and location of saving righteousness for Kant.
He does, as mentioned earlier, seem to hold to the possibility of an alien
righteousness. Karl Barth supports this point, explaining that, for Kant, “It
is solely in the idea, known only to God, of the improved disposition, that
justice can be done to eternal righteousness. It is this ideal righteousness, and
not the righteousness of a disposition which we might find present within us!
It will therefore always remain a righteousness which is not our own.”40
By “idea” Barth is referring to the prototype, or archetype, which in
Book 2 of Religion Kant employs as the guiding moral principle and force for
atonement and conversion. Throughout his religious writings, Kant tiptoes
delicately around the divine identity of Christ (a mystery to reason) revealed
in Scripture. Earlier we saw that in conversion the “new man” takes on the
disposition of the archetype, the “Son of God,” including his sufferings, and
this archetype implanted into the primordial reason of humanity, when acted
upon during conversion, serves to satisfy sins committed. In The Conflict of
the Faculties, Kant identifies the prototype with grace. His definition of grace
here in this work greatly blurs the distinction between the moral subject and
divine presence/action. The issue then becomes whether, and if so, how the
“idea” can be considered an external righteousness. Barth’s assessment does
lend credence to the interpretation that, for Kant, the idea, or prototype,
which exists in primordial human reason is external to humankind, and in
this sense, an external righteousness, but he does not venture to explain how.41
Stephen Palmquist’s recent assessment of the possibility of external
righteousness is less conservative than Barth’s. In his 2016 commentary on
Religion, Palmquist interprets Kant as admitting a morally justified belief in
following: According to our mode of estimation, [to us] who are unavoidably restricted
to temporal conditions in our conceptions of the relationship of cause to effect, the
deed, as a continuous advance in infinitum from a defective good to something better,
always remains defective, so that we are bound to consider the good as it appears to us,
i.e., according to the deed, as at each instant inadequate to a holy law. But because of
the disposition from which it derives and which transcends the senses, we can think of
the infinite progression of the good toward conformity to the law as being judged by
him who scrutinizes the heart (through his pure intellectual intuition) to be a perfected
whole even with respect to the deed (the life conduct). And so notwithstanding his
permanent deficiency, a human being can still expect to be generally well-pleasing to
God, at whatever point in time his existence be cut short” (ibid., 109 [AA 6:68]).
40
Barth, Protestant Thought, 183.
41
Kant says that “grace is none other than the nature of the human being insofar
as he is determined to actions by a principle which is intrinsic to his own being, but
supersensible. . . . Since we want to explain this principle, although we know no
further ground for it, we represent it as a stimulus to good produced in us by God, the
predisposition to which we did not establish in ourselves, and so, as grace . . . grace,
is the hope that good will develop in us—a hope awakened by belief in our original
moral predisposition to good and by the example of humanity as pleasing to God in
his son” (Religion and Rational Theology, 268 [AA 7:43]).
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a God/man, an interpretation which quells any misgivings as to an external
righteousness. In a careful analysis of book 2, Section 1/B (AA 6:66), Palmquist
explains the following:
The archetype is an idea, not an “ideal” (i.e., a transcendental object)
so the “ideal of humanity” must refer neither to the archetype nor
the historical Jesus, considered merely as a man, but to the God-man
(i.e., in Christian tradition, to the Christ), considered as a transcendent
object of faith. Therefore Kant’s claim is that the conviction of a human
being whose vicarious suffering was grounded in a total reliance on the
archetype would be—Kant actually dares to say “is!”—“completely valid,”
not just for everyone on earth but for all possible human beings; this makes
such a person the prototype (i.e., the first model) for imperfect human beings
to emulate. Kant’s (crucial) qualification is that such a belief in an ideal
God-man as the representative of all humanity before God’s “supreme
righteousness” . . . retains its validity only “if” one who interprets Jesus’
sufferings (for example) as an expression of the Christ is able to adopt a
conviction similar to Jesus’ (archetypal) conviction. In other words, those
who aspire to be Christian must, through a commitment of practical faith,
conform their own conviction to the archetype that is embedded within this
ideal, thereby affirming the dominion of the good through a “righteousness
that is not ours.”42

Palmquist’s reading of this passage is innovative and, if true, a windfall
for Kant scholars advocating a positive, Protestant-oriented interpretation of
Kant’s concept of grace. An inductive study of both this passage and the larger
section surrounding it (AA 6:60–66) reveals that Palmquist may be incorrect
in identifying the “God-man” with the “ideal.” Evidence that challenges
Palmquist’s interpretation is the initial paragraph where Kant describes him
as the model of humanity, “the Word,” and his origins as the “idea of him
proceed[ing] from God” (AA 6:60). In the second paragraph, Kant calls
the same the “ideal of moral perfection” and the “prototype.” (AA 6:61) It
appears that Kant might be referring to the same concept/entity in different
ways in respect to its role or function in moral religion. Nevertheless, his
reckoning of the “human model” with the “idea,” ideal of humanity, and the
prototype/archetype appears to discredit Palmquist’s argument that the
“ideal” is other than the “idea.”43
Another key to interpreting this passage is where (just prior to the passage
in question) Kant introduces the hypothetical nature (“Now if a human being
42
Stephen Palmquist, Comprehensive Commentary on Kant’s Religion within the
Bounds of Bare Reason (New York: Wiley & Sons, 2016), 176–177. Cf. 176 (AA 6:60),
“Now, such a conviction with all the sufferings taken upon oneself for the sake of the
world’s greatest good—as thought in the ideal of humanity—is completely valid, for
all human beings, and at all times and in all worlds, before the supreme righteousness,
if the human being makes, as he ought to do, his conviction (die seinige) similar
to it. It will of course always remain a righteousness that is not ours insofar as this
righteousness of ours would have to consist in a lifestyle completely and unfailingly in
accordance with that conviction” (ibid., 176 [AA 6:66]).
43
Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, 103 (AA 6:60).
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of such a truly divine disposition had descended . . . from heaven to earth at a
specific time . . .”) of his discussion.44 This fully-human teacher, because of his
impeccable teaching and conduct and not because of any divine credentials,
could rightly speak of himself as if the “ideal of goodness . . . [was] displayed
incarnate in him.” The disposition, “the purest one”, or righteousness, of
this human—not only his teachings and conduct, but also the sufferings
undertaken for the good of the world—Kant claims could rightly be associated
with each moral self who adopts this disposition and strives to emulate it in
their own disposition. Yet, in spite of its adoption, it “will ever remain a
righteousness which is not our own.”45 Is Kant bringing back the content
of the Christian atonement of tradition, as Palmquist seems to say, even the
doctrine of the imputation of divine righteousness made possible by the union
of human and divine? It is doubtful that Palmquist’s strict identification of
the ideal as a God-man can be true because of the merely hypothetical nature
of what Kant can assert under the parameters of his epistemology as well as the
problem of terminology already mentioned. One thing that can be certain is
Kant’s agnostic bent toward much that is supernatural and revealed,46 which,
in this case, means theoretical knowledge of divinity in the ideal human is
impossible. The divinity of Christ is also problematic for moral reasons. A
model who is divine, and not merely human, is exceedingly harmful to the
self’s moral striving.47
A better interpretation of Kant’s intent in this passage would be that,
despite no way of knowing, speculatively or morally, if the ideal is also divine,
such an ideal human, whose disposition reflects in the purest form the moral
law, (as a divine being would) and who suffers for the highest good of the
world, would consist of a righteousness that is “perfectly valid” for anyone
who emulates this disposition. What remains unsaid in this interpretation is
how one who is merely human, but has a divine disposition, can provide a
“perfectly valid” source of righteousness for the world, and admittedly, this
problem points back in favor of Palmquist’s interpretation. Nevertheless, I
agree with Barth’s assertion that Kant intends that this righteousness is an
external righteousness whose source is not the moral subject’s own insomuch
as an idea residing in humankind’s rational faculty from the beginning can
be considered an external righteousness.48 Kant presumably believes he has
provided epistemic justification for external righteousness when he says
Ibid., 106 (AA 6:63).
Ibid., 108 (AA 6:66).
46
Ibid. Kant’s agnosticism is observable more than once in the section. Notice the
following example: “[H]ad he brought about, through all this, an incalculably great
moral good in the world, through all this: even then we would have no cause to assume
in him anything else except a naturally begotten human being. . . . Not that we would
thereby absolutely deny that he might indeed also be a supernaturally begotten human
being” (ibid., 106 [AA 6:63]).
47
Ibid., 264–265 (AA 7:39).
48
Barth, Protestant Thought, 183.
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it “must be possible” to appropriate this righteousness, but this is only the
case; and this is a consistent qualifier of Kant’s, if one makes the movement
to associate their own disposition with that of the prototype (i.e., makes
themselves receptive to grace).49
Soteriological Innovation—Receptivity to Grace
The tenet that one must make themselves “receptive” to God’s grace through
free decision is troublesome for some, especially of the Protestant persuasion,
who ascribe to a sola fide and/or forensic justification formula.50 It is true that
Kant’s religion does not allow for grace before conversion (i.e., prevenient
grace), since this would violate the free moral status of the self. But, after
conversion, Kant allows for grace, in whatever inchoate form, as a necessity
for reaching the summum bonum.51
Laying aside the obvious weakness in his theology of the omission of
prevenient and cooperating grace,52 Kant’s teaching of the need to make
oneself “receptive”53 to grace does not prove as disgusting to Protestant
Christian sensibilities as some might imagine. In fact, Kant is making a very
logical point within his own system—one that, if viewed within a covenantal
framework for justification, helps to explain the identity of justification as
both an initial event and a dynamic process, what might be termed, “dynamic
justification.”54
Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, 108 (AA 6:66).
Alister McGrath recognizes that the Protestant Reformers created a disjunction
between justification and regeneration, and it is precisely this disjunction that would
make Protestants suspicious of Kant’s notion of moral receptivity. See Alister McGrath,
A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005), 217.
51
Wood argues to this end, using Kant’s own reduction ad absurdum practicum
argument that grace is a postulate of practical reason. Essentially, if one denies God,
then one denies they can conceive the possibility of moral perfection; then they have
denied the unconditioned component of the summum bonum; if one denies they can
conceive the summum bonum, then they commit themselves to not obeying the moral
law. This is practically absurd, and so Allen argues that grace is a necessary postulate
(Kant’s Moral Religion, 248).
52
Kant does not seem to have any room for the illuminative and empowering work
of the Holy Spirit in his moral system, which is consistent with his epistemology. He
does not deem the Spirit as a person relevant to moral religion but as a manifestation
of the teaching and conduct of Christ, which for moral reason is “contained” in the
prototype (AA 7:59; AA 6:69). See also Mariña, “Kant on Grace,” 385, 387.
53
Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, 115 (AA 6:75). Kant’s definition of grace
includes the notion of moral receptivity. He writes that “receptivity is all that we, on
our part, can attribute to ourselves, whereas a superior’s decision to grant a good for
which the subordinate has no more than (moral receptivity) is called grace.
54
On the concept of dynamic justification, see, for example the undated journal
article by Robert Brinsmead, “The Dynamic, Ongoing Nature of Justification
by Faith,” Present Truth 18 (n.d.): 20, 22, http://presenttruthmag.com/archive/
49
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Kant is motivated in his insistence on moral “receptivity” by two things.
First, he is concerned that a belief in grace is morally harmful to human beings.
It promotes a dangerous confidence in the moral subject due to a supposed,
but unknown, foreign power. This may lead the moral self into an inertial
state of thinking where it expects from above “what we ought to be seeking
within us.”55 A second reason for the necessity for “receptivity” comes from
Kant’s respect for the transcendence and sovereignty of God as it is expressed
in the concept of immutability and atemporality. God’s actions are conceived
in eternity, and thus, since God cannot be said to respond (without using an
anthropomorphism), his actions in time are unilateral. Kant also holds that
grace is not particular in aim, but universal.56 Grace then is comparable to
an eternally derived “shower” which God “pours out” in time on humanity,
but which is not received without the moral volition of the creature. In his
Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion, Kant explains the following:
[I]t is anthropomorphic to represent God as able to be gracious after he was
previously wrathful. For this would posit an alteration in God. But God is and
remains always the same, equally gracious and equally just. It depends only on
us whether we will become objects of his grace or of his punitive justice [emphasis
supplied]. The alteration, therefore, goes on within us; it is the relation in which
we stand to God which is altered whenever we improve ourselves.57

It is clear from the above passage that Nicholas Wolterstoff’s charge that
Kant’s “receptivity” doctrine renders God as “required to forgive” is false.58
What Kant is actually saying by “receptivity” is that human beings must place
themselves under the “stream” of the eternally generated “shower” of God’s
grace, and the only means by which they may do this is by choosing the good
moral disposition and living by their self-chosen good maxims. As Mariña
explains, “it is not our adoption of a good disposition that is the condition of
God’s [gracious] action upon us . . . but that rather, our adoption of such a
disposition is the condition of our ability to be receptive of and recognize God’s
grace, which is ever present.”59 This argument may be qualified somewhat
by Kant’s statement in Religion that seems to describe a sequential interplay
PTM%2018%20Radical%20Nature%20of%20JBF.pdf, where he approvingly
interprets Luther that justification by faith is a “dynamic, ongoing action in the
divine-human relationship. . . . Justification is not static, it is dynamic and ongoing.
As we constantly believe, God constantly justifies” (emphasis original).
55
Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, 109, 207 (AA 6:68, 191–192).
56
Mulholland, “Freedom and Providence,” 80–81.
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Kant, Religion and Rational Theology. 379–380 (AA 28:1039).
58
Wolterstorff, “Conundrums,” 44–45. Kant wrote in response to Wolterstorff,
“For what in our earthly life (and perhaps even in all future times and in all worlds)
is always only in mere becoming . . . is imputed to us as if we already possessed it
here in full. And to this we indeed have no rightful claim (according to the empirical
cognition we have of ourselves), so far as we know ourselves” (Religion and Rational
Theology, 115–116 [AA 6:75–76]).
59
Mariña, “Kant on Grace,” 381.
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of human and divine where God “first sees their moral constitution . . . and
only then makes up for their incapacity to satisfy this requirement on their
own.” However, this latter passage should be understood as descriptive next to
the larger metaphysical context of Kant’s doctrine of God, where God is the
unilateral cause of a universal grace.60
Wolterstoff’s other criticism is that Kant destroys divine freedom in
requiring forgiveness. If Kant is right that God is not free, that would extirpate
grace as unmerited favor (a gift). Wolterstorff thinks that God’s actions in this
case would be stemming from his justice, not from grace. Kant cannot hold,
he asserts, that God’s divine aid is both a duty and a freely given gift.61 Kant’s
method, as Wolterstorff sees it, consists of “probing the implications of our
human rights and obligations” and holding God to the same human world
of moral obligations.62 But in his rejoinder, Wolterstorff also draws on the
empirical evidence of human relationships, arguing that “if we have a moral
claim on someone’s doing something, then for that person to do that is not
for the person to act graciously, but for the person to grant what is due us.”63
Wolterstorff is correct that divine forgiveness is motivated by divine
love, but in the divine act of mercy he claims that divine mercy transcends
divine justice in the act of forgiveness. This is counterintuitive to both classical
theological and biblical concepts: of God as containing the fullness of all
perfections and incapable of change, and of God as a merciful judge who is also
just in His justification of sinners through the satisfaction made by the Son.64
Kant, for his part, adheres to the classical understanding of divine
perfections and maintains that God is “always the same, equally gracious and
equally just.”65 Compared with Wolterstorff, for Kant, divine justice does not
trump benevolence. In his Lectures, he writes that God’s justice is a perfection
“that limits God’s benevolence,” not in God’s nature, but “only in the measure
we have not made ourselves worthy of it.” With this dialectical tension of the
perfections of divine grace and justice, Kant is able to speak of divine justice in
terms of a “combination of benevolence with holiness.” Thus, Wolterstorff’s
charge that Kant “requires God to forgive” because he shortchanges divine
grace in favor of justice is suspect.66

Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, 115 (AA 6:75).
Wolterstorff, “Conundrums,” 44–45. In comparison, Kant expressly states that
God’s gifts do not flow from his justice, “for if they came to us from justice, then there
would be no praemia gratuita [gifts of grace], but rather we would have to possess some
right to demand them, and God would have to be bound to give them to us” (Religion
and Rational Theology, 417 [AA 28:1085]).
62
Wolterstorff, “Conundrums,” 44, 47.
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Ibid., 44.
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Ibid., 46.
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Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, 379–380 (AA 28:1039).
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Ibid., 410 (AA 28:1076).
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As to Wolterstorff’s assertion that for God’s grace to actually be grace it
must be free,67 this seems self-evident enough under the normal conditions of
human relationships—assuming divine relationships are analogous to these.
But his claim that Kant diminishes divine freedom belies a simplistic view of
divine freedom on his own part, at least when divine freedom is considered
in relation to a covenantal framework for the understanding of justification.68
In a covenantal framework for justification, God calls the sinner from
where they are to a new life, but with specific stipulations that must be
subsequently observed (cf. Abraham). When the sinner embarks on this new
life, a new relationship with God, the perpetuation of their relationship with
God is both founded in grace and necessarily contingent on their moral growth
as it expresses their trust in God. Supposing the new creature commits a sin,
or, supposing that the good works the new creature performed with good
conscience are still deficient to meet the demands of the law, the question at
issue is whether God is legally required (as Wolterstorff charges Kant with
holding) to forgive/impute righteousness. The very nature of the covenant, in
that it is founded on promise, indicates that by virtue of God’s holy nature
(commensurate with the law) and His inability to lie, God will forgive. In this
covenant framework, it does indeed appear that God is morally bound, albeit
by His own free choice, and perhaps paradoxically, because of the eternal
claims of the law which are commensurate with his character, to forgive.69
All of this is, of course, contingent on the sinners’ decision to make
themselves “receptive” to God’s grace through repentance and confession; or,
in the case of an individual whose has performed good but deficient works,
have done their best to fulfill God’s law. In this covenantal scenario, divine
freedom is still intact, but through the divine act of initiating a covenant and
entering the relationship, God has freely chosen to limit Himself to some
obligations. It is fascinating that Kant seems aware, to some degree, of this
covenantal framework. In The Conflict of the Faculties, Kant articulates an
objection to his grounding belief in divine supplementation on moral reason
instead of a revealed, covenantal framework.
To believe that God, by an act of kindness, will in some unknown way fill
what is lacking to our justification is to assume gratuitously a cause that
will satisfy the need we feel . . . for when we expect something by grace of
Ibid., 379 (AA 28:1039).
Rhys Bezzant recognizes how a covenant (in this case Edwards’s) impacts
discourse on divine and human responsibility in justification: “The language of
covenant serves to create a framework connecting holy demands with justified status,
just as it gives objective ballast to the experience of faith and grace: it situates the
experience of salvation within a biblical and historical framework” (“The Gospel of
Justification and Edwards Social Vision,” in Jonathan Edwards and Justification, ed.
Josh Moody [Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2012], 79).
69
Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, 231 (AA 8:339). In “The End of All
Things” Kant also recognizes the claims of the law on God, stating that “the law, as an
unchanging order lying in the nature of things, is not to be left up to even the creator’s
arbitrary will, to decide its consequences thus or otherwise” (ibid.).
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a superior, we cannot assume that we must get it as a matter of course; we
can expect it only if it was actually promised to us, as in a formal contract.
So it seems that we can hope for that supplement and assume that we shall
get it only insofar as it has been actually pledged through divine revelation.70

Kant’s embedded objector claims that a legitimate hope in justifying
grace may be gained from the promises of God made in the form of a contract.
Though Kant himself would not accept revealed knowledge as grounds for
belief in divine aid, he understands on some level how grace in a covenant
framework might work. What he does not realize, as far as we find here, is that
the notion of the moral agent’s “receptivity” as a condition of grace (imputed
righteousness) after conversion is a necessary cog in the covenantal framework
of the interplay of God and the human agent in justification.71
		
Summary and Remarks
Kant’s subjective atonement fails in explaining expiation in at least three ways.
He fails to explain how debt may be removed by one phase of the moral
self-rendering satisfaction for another. His failure in this aspect comes about
because of a contradiction in the structure of the noumenal self as absolutely
free and spontaneous and in his insistence that the noumenal self actuate its own
transformation. Finally, he does not adequately explain how the permanence
of the evil disposition, which has chosen its maxims, can change these
without some condition that is able to overcome the disposition to evil and to
choose the good.
In terms of the possibility and identity of grace, Kant cannot allow grace
into the conversion event. The overriding reason for this is that it would violate
the autonomous freedom of moral agents, who must choose for themselves
good or evil to be moral agents. For the same reason, cooperative grace, during
or after conversion, is not beneficial to moral progress. These points must be
qualified by the fact that Kant would also say that grace in these forms cannot
be denied—they are simply not objects of knowledge.

Ibid., 271 (AA 7:47).
The notion of Kantian “receptivity” along with some of the same terminology
(i.e., “disposition,” “deficiency”), can be found in a covenantal context in the
devotional writings of nineteenth/early twentieth century author, Ellen White, who
wrote, “Those who with sincere will, with contrite heart, are putting forth humble
efforts to live up to the requirements of God are looked upon by the Father with
pitying tender love; He regards such as obedient children, and the righteousness of
Christ is imputed unto them” (Ellen G. White to Elders M. and H. Miller, 23 July
1889, (Letter 4, 1889), Ellen G. White Estate, Silver Springs, MD, in idem, The Ellen
G. White 1888 Materials, 4 vols. [Washington, DC: Ellen G. White Estate, 1987],
1:402); “When it is in the heart to obey God, when efforts are put forth to this end,
Jesus accepts this disposition and effort as man’s best service, and He makes up for
the deficiency with His own divine merit. But He will not accept those who claim to
have faith in Him, and yet are disloyal to His Father’s commandment” (idem, Selected
Messages, 3 vols. [Washington, DC: Review & Herald, 1958], 1:382).
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The transformation to the good disposition allows for a legitimate
hope in divine aid to make up for inevitable deficiency. But this is only on
the condition that the moral agents make themselves “receptive” to grace.
On this point, Kant is “most original”72 as a corrective to forensic notions
of justification following the Protestant reformation and in pointing to a
dynamic view of justification. The identity of this supplement is an idea of
righteousness located in the original, created predisposition of humanity by
God, and thus, technically external.
Kant famously said in his first critique that his efforts to limit knowledge
were intended to “make room for faith.”73 Recognizing the limits of one’s
knowledge is an invaluable skill in any field of knowledge, but in theology
it is paramount because the subject of study is chiefly a transcendent God.
Kant’s approach to religion, then, is not wholly without merit, for it restrains
speculation that can be harmful to individual and corporate faith.
Kant’s pursuit to justify belief in personal salvation ineluctably places
him face-to-face with the mystery of atonement, and his caution serves him
well in grappling with this mystery if we take into consideration his view of
knowledge as scientific certainty. However, without revealed content, Kant
struggles decidedly to make sense of rudimentary principles of Christian faith
that have shaped the faith of believers across ages. He wrestles with profound
questions on atonement that, in summary, leave him with a “remarkable
antinomy” of faith in satisfaction and faith in the ability to become wellpleasing to God.74 He attempts to solve this by considering what is most
beneficial to morality and by studiously avoiding, for the sake of intellectual
honesty, what cannot be known by speculative reasoning. Some scholars
argue that he fails to resolve it.75
From the perspective of revealed faith, Kant’s religious project may
indeed provide some justification for belief, say, for instance, in the argument
for God’s existence, freedom, and a life of holiness and future happiness all
inextricably linked to the duty to obey the law (cf. Rom 1:20). However, Kant’s
insistence on autonomy severs the self from its maker, and his imperative
of divine grace is, in many instances, an obscure wish at best. Rather than
securing infallible grounds for belief, this evaluation of Kant’s encounter with
the mystery of atonement finds him returning his interpreter back again to the
gulf between God and sinful humankind.
His failure need not be taken completely as such, however. Instead,
it may also be seen as an affirmation of the paradoxical nature of the
atonement—both to the theoretical and the practical uses of reason. The
paradoxical character of the atonement, it may be argued, is one of the
greatest arguments for its truth and is evidence to support belief. For, if one
may legitimately hope that divine aid is available to bridge the gulf between
Mariña, “Kant on Grace,” 400.
Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, 117 (B, xxx).
74
Kant, Religion and Rational Theology, 147 (AA 6:116).
75
Silber, “Kant’s Religion,” cxxxii. See also Wolterstorff, “Conundrums,” 48–52.
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them and God, it is reasonable to conclude that, as grace is the action of one
whose being, knowledge, and power exceeds cognition, such aid should be
ultimately beyond human comprehension.76

76
See C. Stephen Evans, Why Christian Faith Still Makes Sense: A Response to
Contemporary Challenges (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2015), 104–113. Evans
makes a similar argument about paradox as an apologetic tool in regards to revelation
and the incarnation.

